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Respondent, Case No. 17082 
GENICE GAY BISHOP, 
Third-Party Defendant-
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I. 
THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISIONS DO 
NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF THE INTRA-FAMILY 
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN A CASE INVOLVING 
NEGLIGENCE. 
In Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court abrogated intra-spousal immunity for intentional 
torts. In Stoker, the wife, after obtaining a divorce, brought 
suit against her former husband for intentionally inflicted torts 
committed during their marriage. The lower court dismissed the 
action based on intra-spousal immunity. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed and held that §30-2-4 of the Utah Married Women's Act, 
Utah Code Ann., authorized a married woman to "prosecute and 
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defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her 
• • • right to be free of an intentional tort of her husband." 
Id. at 5. The court reasoned that the main objective of the Utah 
Married Women's Act was to eliminate all of the disabilities 
imposed on married women under the common law unity theory. 
Therefore, the common law intra-spousal immunity was in direct 
opposition to the statute. 
Although one can argue persuasively that the Utah 
Married Women's Act as found in §30-2-4, U.C.A. (1953), does not 
really create a right in the wife to sue her husband in tort or 
vice versa, in the Stoker setting, however, abrogation of intra-
spousal immunity is undoubtedly reasonable. The policy most fre-
quently invoked for retaining the immunity is the preservation of 
domestic tranquility and family solidarity. In the case of 
intentional torts, however, the argument does not make as much 
sense because the tranquility has already been shattered by the 
tortfeasor's spouse. The argument is especially weak in Stoker 
because the marriage sought to be preserved had already been 
dissolved at the time of the suit. 
The recent decision of Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 
37 (1980), also bears upon the present problem. In Elkington, 
the defendant, in a jdry trial, was found guilty of "sexually 
assaulting and abusing his adopted daughter." Id. at 38. The 
defendant claimed error because the trial court refused to 
instruct the jury that consent of the daughter constituted a 
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defense, and because punitive damages awarded by the jury were 
excessive, and defendant also raised the defense of intra-family 
immunity. 
The Supreme court summarily dismissed defendant's intra-
family immunity argument by noting that intra-family immunity is 
an affirmative defense which defendant failed to plead at his 
earlier trial. However, the court went on to say: 
There is a clear majority trend toward 
limiting or abolishing the immunity which 
the common law conferred on parents as to 
actions brought by their children. We 
think it is sufficient here to say that 
there is no foundation in.our own law, 
statutory or decisional, upon which to 
base parental immunity against a suit 
such as the instant one; and we don't 
think there should be. Id. at 40. 
(Citations omitted, emphasis added) 
Thus, the court notes that the trend is either toward limiting or 
abolishing intra-family immunity. In the context of intentional 
sexual abuse, the court finds the invocation of the intra-family 
immunity doctrine particularly objectionable. 
There are, however, many situations in which intra-
family immunity would serve the purposes for which it was origi-
nally promulgated. These purposes include danger of fraud or 
collusion, and preservation of family tranquility and parental 
discipline. For example, where a child is accidentally injured 
when he picks up a sharp object that his mother had been using, 
it is clear that family tranquilty and parental discipline will 
be diminished, if not destroyed, if the child were to sub-
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sequently sue his mother. Family tranquility would also be 
destroyed if a parent were allowed to sue his child for injuries 
sustained when the parent stepped on the child's roller skate 
left on the front porch stairs. Many other situations could be 
imagined where a suit between a parent and child is to be 
discouraged. There is a tremendous difference between injuries 
negligently inflicted, wherein family tranquilty and parental 
discipline has not been affected, and injuries intentionally 
inflicted, wherein family tranquility and parental discipline has 
effectively been destroyed. 
Thus in the present case, where the damage sustained by 
the plaintiff was negligently inflicted by the plaintiff's minor 
daughter, this court should recognize the intra-family immunity 
doctrine and refuse to allow such a suit. The present case is 
easily distinguishable from Elkington and in view of the uninten-
tional nature of the injury here, it is clear that family 
tranquility could be disturbed by such a suit. Therefore, 
although this court has refused to recognize intra-family 
immunity as a defense to an intentionally inflicted tort, there 
is a need for such an immunity in the context of negligently 
inflicted injuries. The trial court's action in granting a 
judgment in contribution against third-party defendant Genice Gay 
Bishop should be reversed. 
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POINT II. 
THE FACT THAT A PARTY IS COVERED BY 
INSURANCE IS IMMATERIAL AND OTHERWISE 
INADMISSIBLE. 
Defendant states in his brief that the real party in 
interest in this case is the insurance company, not Genice 
Bishop, Charles Nielsen or George Bishop. Thus, defendant 
t '' no es • • • the suit here does not bog itself down on an inter-
family (sic) immunity problem, but it is an inter-family 
(sic)insurance company ••• problem." (Respondent's brief, p. 3) 
The fact that the parties injured are covered by insurance, 
however, is not a matter to be considered in this case. 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that: 
Evidence that a person was, at the time a 
harm was suffered by another, insured 
wholly or partially against loss arising 
from liability for that harm is inad-
missible as tending to prove negligence 
or other wrongdoing. 
In Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 
(1965), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the general rule: 
That the question of insurance is 
immaterial and should not be injected 
into the trial; and that it is the duty 
of both counsel and the court to guard 
against it. Id. at 123. 
The Utah Supreme Court reasserted that position recently in Tjas 
v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (1979). Consequently third-party defen-
dant objects to any reference in this case to the fact of 
insurance coverage. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court in Rubalcava v. 
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Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), emphasized the 
immateriality of insurance coverage in the context of an intra-
spousal immunity defense, except as to demonstrate a further need 
for the defendant to protect against collusion. The court 
stated: 
The answer to the argument for marital 
harmony: that discord will not be engen-
dered when the insurance company is to 
pay, is neither sound nor entirely 
realistic. The question of liability can 
be ascertained justly only upon its own 
merits. Whether there is insurance or 
not is immaterial to this determination. 
However, the fact cannot be ignored that 
where there is insurance, and this is 
known to both parties, the temptation to 
collusion exists; and this is increased 
when the supposedly adverse parties are 
in the symbiotic relationship of husband 
and wife. (Emphasis added) 384 P.2d at 
391. 
It should also be noted that there are many instances in 
which intra-family immunity may be at issue and the parties would 
not be covered by insurance. Hence insurance coverage cannot be 
a reason for abrogation of intra-family immunity in a neglgience 
setting. Thus, the respondent's argument that this is an intra-
family insurance problem rather than intra-family immunity 
problem is not a proper argument. 
Respectfully submitted this ,,Z::~ay of March, 1981. 
::R;;-~L: ~~illiams 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
and Third-Party Defendant-Appellant 
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